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When Reliable is Reliable Enough: The Use of Expert 
Testimony After Kumho Tire v. Carmichael 
John Hein* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael1 the Supreme Court held that 
the district court judge serves as the gatekeeper for determining the 
reliability of nonscientific expert testimony.2 In doing so, the Court 
officially placed responsibility for determining the reliability of both 
scientific and nonscientific expert testimony in the hands of district 
courts.3 Some commentators regard the Court’s holding as 
symbolically putting the brakes on the runaway use of “junk 
science,”4 where experts tailor their findings to fit the theory of the 
highest bidder.5 Others view it as the final step by the Court to open 
the door to well-reasoned, yet novel scientific or technical 
approaches.6 Regardless of one’s view, little doubt exists that coupled 
with the growing use of expert testimony,7 the Court’s decision in 
Kumho will impact seriously all areas of litigation.8 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2001, Washington University School of Law. 
 1. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 2. Id. at 141. 
 3. Id. Along with this gatekeeping function, the Court granted district courts the 
flexibility and discretion necessary to determine reliability based on the facts of the individual 
case. Id. at 141-42. 
 4. PETER W. HUBER,  GALILEO’S REVENGE:  JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2 
(1991). See also Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 158 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the gatekeeping 
function as the “discretion to choose among reasonable means of excluding expertise that is 
fausse and science that is junky” (emphasis in original)). 
 5. Kenneth S. Geller & Michael E. Lackey, Jr., Supreme Court’s Decision A Boon To 
Public, 17 PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY , Apr. 1999, at 1, 3 (noting that the fact that an expert 
makes a living testifying in courtrooms rather than in a laboratory is a factor bearing on 
reliability). 
 6. William H. Latham, The “Gatekeepers’ Discretion:” Flexible Standards on 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Wake of Kumho, S.C. LAWYER, July -Aug. 1999, at 15. 
 7. Cynthia H. Cwik, Guarding The Gate: Expert Evidence Admissibility, LITIGATION, 
Summer, 1999, at 6 (reporting that one expert consulting company claims to have over 7,600 
different catego ries of experts available to assist in litigation).  
 8. E.g., Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (fabric testing); 
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The problem facing district courts is that while Kumho settled the 
debate over the applicability of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals9 to nonscientific expert testimony, the Kumho 
holding did little to clarify the broad, vague concepts by which the 
district courts should determine reliability.10 This Note examines the 
effect that this lack of guidance has had within the district courts. Part 
I examines the evolution of the law governing the reliability and 
admissibility of expert testimony. Part II reviews recent cases and 
illustrates the level of uncertainty faced by litigants. In addition, Part 
II discusses the shortcomings of current interpretations as they relate 
to the roles of the judge and jury and the proper functioning of the 
adversarial system. Part III explains proposals currently under 
consideration by various commentators and by an Advisory 
Committee poised to revise the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part IV 
proposes a model approach to the reliability inquiry and discusses its 
advantages over current interpretations.  
II. THE BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF THE RELIABILITY 
INQUIRY 
A. Frye and the General Acceptance Test 
In Frye v. United States,11 the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia addressed the admissibility of systolic blood pressure 
deception test results.12 The court determined that for such scientific 
 
Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (contract 
damages); Nemir v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., 60 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Mich. 1999) 
(products liability); Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (psychiatry); 
United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999) (handwriting analysis); In re Doe, 
981 P.2d 723 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999) (child abuse). 
 9. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the Court held that district courts are required to act 
as “gatekeepers” to ensure that all scientific expert testimony is based on reliable data and 
methodology. Id. The district court judge must also ensure that the expert applied the 
methodology to the facts of the case in a reliable manner. Id. 
 10. The Daubert Court listed four nonexhaustive factors, or signposts, to guide the district 
courts in their reliability determination: (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested; (2) 
whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether the technique has a 
known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory has gained general acceptance 
within the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94. 
 11. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 12. Id. at 1014. The systolic blood pressure deception test was the predecessor of the 
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evidence to be admissible, the theory and methodology of the expert 
testifying to the evidence must be generally accepted within the 
relevant scientific community. 13 In Frye, the court held that the 
evidence was not admissible because the blood pressure deception 
test had not achieved sufficient recognition in relevant scientific 
communities.14  
The general acceptance test,15 as it came to be known, remained 
virtually unchallenged until the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (the Rules) in 1975.16 The Rules generated disagreement in 
the legal community regarding the future viability and applicability 
of the Frye standard.17 Despite this period of substantial debate, the 
Frye general acceptance test remained the standard for determining 
the reliability and admissibility of proffered expert testimony for 
almost seventy years.18  
B. Daubert: Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the District Court’s 
Gatekeeper Role  
In 1993 the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,19 holding that Rule 70220 superceded the Frye 
 
modern polygraph test. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. (holding that the systolic blood pressure deception test had “not yet gained such 
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities . . .”).  
 15. Id. The court stated the general acceptance test: “[T]he thing from which the 
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field which it belongs.” Id. 
 16. FED. R. EVID. 102 states that the purpose of the federal rules is to secure fairness, 
eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the growth of the law of evidence to the 
end that truth may be justly determined. The Supreme Court interprets this to mean that there 
should be a liberal standard of admission and that Congress designed the rules to depend on 
lawyer-adversaries and sensible triers of fact. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579, 587. 
 17. 509 U.S. at 586 n.4. Like the scholarly community, courts also began to depart from 
the traditional Frye analysis. Compare United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(applying the “general acceptance” standard), with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 
F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting the “general acceptance” test). 
 18. 509 U.S. at 585. To date, eleven states specifically rejected Daubert in favor of 
retaining the Frye standard: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi, New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. The majority of the states include the 
Daubert factors as either helpful or controlling in their tests. See Phillips v. Indus. Mach., 597 
N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1999) (adopting Daubert standards). 
 19. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 20. FED. R. EVID. 702. The rule states: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
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general acceptance test.21 The Daubert Court reasoned that a rigid 
general acceptance requirement would conflict with the liberal thrust 
of the Rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional 
barriers to opinion testimony.22 The Court tempered this liberalized 
standard by stating that while Daubert and Rule 702 allowed a wider 
range of expert testimony to be admitted, district court judges must 
act as gatekeepers to ensure the reliability of the proffered expert 
testimony. 23  
The Daubert Court listed four nonexhaustive factors to guide 
district courts in their reliability inquiry under Rule 702. 24 Rather 
than discard the Frye general acceptance test completely, the Court 
incorporated it as a factor in its newly crafted inquiry.25 The Daubert 
factors, as they are now known, are: (1) whether the theory or 
technique has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer 
review and publication; (3) whether the technique has a known or 
potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory has gained general 
acceptance within the relevant scientific community. 26  
The Court expressly limited its discussion to scientific 
testimony. 27 This limitation spurred substantial confusion and debate 
 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Id. 
 21. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. In Daubert, plaintiffs Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller were 
born with severe birth defects. The children and their parents brought suit claiming that the 
birth defects were caused by the mother’s use of the prescription drug Bendectin, an anti-nausea 
medication marketed by Merrel-Dow. Id. at 582. 
 22. Daubert, 509 U.S.  at 588 . 
 23. See Phillips, 597 N.W.2d at 388 (Gerard, J., concurring) (noting that twenty-seven 
states have held that the Daubert standards are either helpful or controlling in their 
determinations regarding the admissibility of expert opinion evidence: Alaska, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming). 
 24. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. 
 25. Id. at 594. 
 26. Id. at 593-94. See also  Schmerling v. Danek Med., Inc., No. Civ.A.96-2749, 1999 WL 
712591, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999). While most courts have not departed much from the 
factors enumerated in Daubert, some have begun to expand and now include such additional 
factors as: (1) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s 
application; (2) the relationship of the technique to methods which have been established as 
reliable; and (3) the nonjudicial areas where the method has been used.  
 27. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8. The Court limited its discussion to scientific expert 
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among the circuits as to the scope of Daubert’s application in regard 
to nonscientific testimony.28 Post-Daubert decisions quickly fractured 
into two distinct camps. Several circuits adopted the narrow position 
that Daubert confined the gatekeeping responsibility to scientific 
expert testimony. 29 Others took a broader view, applying Daubert’s 
holding to all proffered expert testimony. 30  
C. Kumho: Extending Daubert to “All” Experts 
In 1999, the Supreme Court resolved the Daubert controversy in 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.31 In Kumho, the right rear tire of a 
minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael exploded, resulting in an 
accident that killed one occupant and severely injured seven others.32 
The survivors and the decedent's representative brought suit against 
the tire manufacturer, Kumho Tire Company. 33 The plaintiffs’ case 
depended largely on the deposition testimony of tire-failure analyst 
Dennis Carlson, Jr., who testified that a defect in the tire’s 
manufacture or design caused the blowout.34 He based his opinion on 
a visual and tactile inspection of the tire and also on his own theory 
that the absence of at least two of the four specific physical signs of 
tire abuse indicated that a defect was the probable cause of the 
blowout.35  
 
testimony because that was the nature of the expertise offered in the case. Id. 
 28. See id. at 600. Chief Justice Rehnquist clearly recognized this when he said:  
Questions arise simply from reading . . . the Court’s opinion, and countless more 
questions will surely arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its teaching in 
particular offers of expert test imony. Does all of this dicta apply to an expert seeking 
to testify on the basis of technical or other specialized knowledge . . . ? 
Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 29. See, e.g. , Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(“Daubert was clearly confined to the evaluation of scientific testimony”). 
 30. See, e.g., Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1997); Tenbarge 
v. Ames Taping Tool Sys., 128 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 31. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 32. Id. at 137. 
 33. Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514 (S.D. Ala. 1996). 
 34. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 142. 
 35. Id. at 144-45 (citing Carlson’s opinion as stating that in the absence of signs of misuse 
or “overdeflection,” separation of the tread from the inner steel belted carcass is ordinarily due 
to a tire defect). If a tire has been subjected to sufficient overdeflection to cause separation, it 
should exhibit certain specific symptoms including:  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Kumho’s attorneys challenged Carlson’s testimony and moved to 
exclude it on the ground that the methodology failed to satisfy Rule 
702’s reliability requirement.36 The district court subjected Carlson’s 
methodology to a Daubert inquiry and found that it was unreliable 
and, therefore, inadmissible.37 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the 
district court, holding that Daubert’s reliability analysis did not apply 
to testimony based on skill or experience.38  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the uncertainty as 
to whether Daubert applied to technical or other specialized 
knowledge, and if so, how the standard should be applied.39 In a 
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh 
Circuit, holding that the gatekeeping duty of Daubert extended to all 
expert testimony. 40  
The Court reasoned that the testimonial latitude granted to expert 
witnesses by Rules 702 and 70341 assumes that an expert’s opinion is 
reliably based on the knowledge and experience of that expert’s 
discipline.42 The Court explained that the plain language of Rule 702 
clearly extends testimonial latitude to all experts.43 Moreover, since 
Rule 702 draws no distinction between scientific and nonscientific 
 
(a) tread wear on the tire’s shoulder that is greater t han the tread wear along the tire’s 
center . . . (b) signs of a “bead groove” where the beads have been pushed too hard 
against the bead seat on the inside of the tire’s rim . . . (c) the sidewalls of the tire with 
[sic] physical signs of deterioration, such as discoloration . . . and/or (d) marks on the 
tire’s rim flange. 
Id. at 144 (internal citations omitted). 
 36. Id. at 145. The Court noted that Rule 702 imposes an obligation on the district court 
judge to make sure that proffered expert testimony is relevant and reliable. Id. at 147 (citing 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 579, 587 (1993)). 
 37. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 145-46. The district court did not question Carlson’s 
qualifications, but rather found his analysis and methodology lacking.  
 38. Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d at 1435 (1997) (reviewing de novo the 
district court’s decision to apply Daubert, and holding that Daubert was limited to testimony 
involving scientific principles and that Carlson’s experience-based testimony was outside the 
scope).  
 39. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 146. 
 40. Id. at 149. 
 41. Id. at 148-49. Unlike an ordinary witness, the expert may testify in the form of 
opinion. That opinion need not be based on firsthand knowledge or observation. Id.  
 42. Id. at 148. 
 43. Id.  
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experts, neither should the courts.44 The Court further reasoned that it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for judges to exercise their 
gatekeeping function if they were required to distinguish between 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.45  
Therefore, the Court granted the district courts broad discretion to 
determine reliability. 46 The Court emphasized, however, that the 
factors enumerated in Daubert neither necessarily nor exclusively 
applied to all experts or all cases.47  
The Kumho holding is important because the use of expert 
testimony touches almost every area of law.48 While Kumho settled 
the dispute over the scope of Daubert, the Court’s desire to avoid a 
restrictive bright-line test left district courts fumbling to find 
consistent ways to apply its nebulous concepts to factual 
circumstances.49 As a result, some courts regarded the reliability 
inquiry as a rigorous exercise, while others approached it only as a 
way to determine whether the expert’s opinion is based on something 
more than mere speculation. 
III. CURRENT APPLICATION: THE LACK OF CONSISTENCY AND 
PREDICTABILITY IN THE PROPONENT’S BURDEN OF PROOF 
At the heart of determining the reliability of proffered expert 
testimony lies the court’s ultimate decision whether to admit or 
exclude that testimony. The decision to exclude proves simple when, 
as in Kumho, the proffered testimony is clearly based on conclusory 
statements drawn from shallow or incomplete investigation.50 
However, the judge’s responsibility under Daubert and Kumho 
becomes a far more daunting task when the issue of reliability is not 
as clear, especially in cases involving novel scientific research or 
 
 44. Id. at 148-49. 
 45. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148. 
 46. Id. at 152-53. 
 47. Id.  
 48. See supra note 8. 
 49. Latham, supra note 6, at 19 (“[T]here is precious little guidance for the district courts 
to use in exercising their extrememly broad discretion.”). 
 50. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 144-45. Despite the fact that the tire at issue was over five years 
old and exhibited all of the signs of wear that Carlson traditionally looked for, he concluded that 
the blowout was caused by a manufacturing defect. Id. 
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technological developments.51 In effect, Daubert and Kumho thrust 
district court judges into unfamiliar territory by obliging them to test 
the soundness of expert testimony even though they may be only 
slightly more suited for the task than the lay juror. However, the 
district court judge does have one familiar point of reference—
namely, the proponent’s burden of proof.52  
The proponent of an expert witness must first establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence53 that the witness is qualified to testify 
as an expert on the issue in question.54 This requires an inquiry into 
the expert’s education, professional background, and breadth of 
experience.55 Courts generally interpret Rule 702’s expertise 
requirement liberally by allowing a broad range of knowledge, skills, 
or training to qualify an expert.56 As such, courts should not impose 
overly rigorous requirements of expertise, but rather should hold that 
requirement satisfied with more generalized qualifications.57 Experts 
should not be excluded simply because they do not have a certain 
degree or particular training deemed appropriate by the district court. 
Once the proponent of expert testimony qualifies the witness, the 
proponent bears the burden of showing reliability of the expert’s 
testimony58 by a preponderance of the evidence.59 This standard, as 
traditionally interpreted, requires that it is more likely than not60 that 
 
 51. See, e.g., Frye, 293 F. at 1013 (asking the difficult question of “[j]ust when scientific 
principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable . . ..”).  
 52. Rule 104 provides that qualifications of a witness and the admissibility of evidence 
should be established by a preponderance of proof. FED. R. EVID. 104. See also Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 592 n.10. 
 53. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “Preponderance of the 
evidence” as the standard of proof in which the evidence “is . . . sufficient to incline a fair and 
impartial mind to one side rather than the other,” or, in other words, shows that the fact sought 
to be proved is more probable than not). 
 54. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 n.10 (citing FED. R. EVID. 104a). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See generally In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741-47 (3d Cir. 1994).  
 57. But see O’Brien v. Sofamar, No. CIV.A.96-8015, 1999 WL 239414, at *1, *3-4 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 30, 1999). 
 58. This assumes that the opponent made a valid challenge to the expert’s qualifications 
or methodology. 
 59. See supra  notes 49-54 and accompanying text. See also Tanner v. Westbrook, 174 
F.3d 542, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 60. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987) (finding preliminary 
factors should be established by a preponderance of proof); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157, 167-69 (1986) (stating that the preponderance standard ensures that the court finds it more 
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the methodology used by the expert in formulating his opinion is 
reliable.  
Despite the preponderance of the evidence standard, many courts 
hold proponents of expert testimony to a higher burden of proof.61 
The cases in this section illustrate that the unpredictable burdens of 
proof applied by courts yield disparate results in factually similar 
cases. Furthermore, these cases show that some courts wrongfully 
exclude testimony based on factors that do not significantly impact 
reliability.  
A. Must an Expert’s Data Be Exact To Be Reliable?: Evidence of 
Exposure in Toxic Substance Exposure Litigation 
In toxic substance exposure litigation, an expert’s failure to 
identify the precise exposure dose level can be fatal to an expert’s 
qualification and to the plaintiff’s case.62 However, given that the 
burden of proof is only a preponderance of the evidence standard, the 
question remains whether knowledge of the precise exposure dose is 
really necessary to make the expert’s methodology and testimony 
reliable. The following two cases clearly illustrate the disparity on 
this issue. 
1. Case I: Goeb v. Tharldson63  
In April, 1990 Tharldson sprayed the Goeb residence with 
Dursban,64 a pesticide manufactured and distributed by the Dow 
Chemical Company.65 Shortly after Tharldson applied the pesticide, 
members of the Goeb family began suffering a wide variety of 
ailments.66 The Goebs contacted Dow seeking advice and were 
 
likely than not that that the technical issues and policy concerns of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence have been satisfied). 
 61. See, e.g. , infra notes 63-85 and accompanying text (where burden on proponent is 
closer to the reasonable doubt standard). 
 62. See, e.g., infra notes 63-85 and accompanying text. 
 63. No. CX-98-2275, 1999 WL 561956, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1999). 
 64. See University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas, UT Southwestern 
Team Traces Gulf War Illness to Chemicals (Nov. 13, 2000), available at 
http://www.swmed.edu/home_pages/epidemi/gws/gws.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2001). 
 65. Goeb, 1999 WL 561956, at *1. 
 66. Id. at *6. The family’s ailments included nausea, diarrhea, excessive salivation, 
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informed that Dursban was neither hazardous nor toxic.67 Dow also 
advised the Goebs that it was safe to remain in the home.68 
The Goebs’ condition worsened and they brought an action69 
against Tharldson and Dow Chemical Company alleging personal 
injury and property damage.70 The Goebs’ case relied heavily on the 
testimony of two expert witnesses, Dr. Sherman and Dr. Kilburn,71 
who testified that the Dursban exposure caused the family’s 
illnesses.72  
Dr. Sherman conducted both a differential diagnosis73 and a 
temporal analysis.74 She interviewed the Goebs regarding their 
medical histories, conducted physical examinations of the family 
members, reviewed their medical records, and examined the results 
of air monitoring tests conducted six weeks after the Dursban 
application. 75 Dr. Sherman found dramatic changes in the overall 
health of each family member that corresponded precisely with the 
Dursban exposure.76 Further research confirmed that the scientific 
 
dizziness, headaches, intestinal cramping, tingling of the tongue, lightheadedness, throat 
irritation, burning sensation in the respiratory tract, difficulty breathing, lethargy, anxiety, 
decreased level of coordination, and vomiting. Id. 
 67. Id. at *1. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. The Goebs claimed not only strict liability, but also that Tharldson negligently 
applied the pesticide and that Dow was negligent in manufacturing, marketing, and selling 
Dursban. In addition, the Goebs alleged that Dow negligently failed to provide adequate 
warnings and instructions for the proper use and application of the chemical. Id. 
 70. Id. The district court dismissed all claims based on inadequate warnings and 
instructions on the ground that those claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. Id. at *2. 
 71. Interview with Dr. Arthur Zahalsky, Physician and Expert Medical Witness, in St. 
Louis, Mo. (Nov. 29, 1999). Dr. Zahalsky consulted with both Dr. Sherman and Dr. Kilburn on 
this case. He believes both possessed all the necessary raw data with which to draw a reliable 
conclusion. However, he believes they failed to extrapolate the information in the manner in 
which this particular court wished to see it. Id. 
 72. Goeb, 1999 WL 561956, at *2. 
 73. See generally Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 156 F.3d 248, 252-53 (1st Cir. 
1998). A differential diagnosis is generally performed after a physical examination. It requires a 
review of the patient’s medical history, clinical tests, and any existing relevant literature. The 
physician eliminates potential causes of the patient’s condition until arriving at one that cannot 
be ruled out. Id. 
 74. Id. Temporal analysis merely looks at the time differential between exposure and the 
onset of symptoms. Id. 
 75. Goeb, 1999 WL 561956, at *4. A review of the family’s medical records, history, and 
physical examinations revealed no significant prior conditions or illnesses. Id. 
 76. Id. at *4. 
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literature on Dursban exposure, as well as a number of Dow 
publications, outlined symptoms consistent with those displayed by 
the Goeb family. 77 Dr. Sherman concluded within a reasonable 
degree of certainty that, more likely than not, the Goebs’ adverse 
reactions and illnesses resulted from their exposure to Dursban.78 
The court excluded Dr. Sherman’s testimony because she could 
not state the Goebs’ exact dose of exposure to Dursban.79 The court 
reasoned that if she could not determine the exact exposure level, her 
conclusion that the family members had been exposed to a dose 
sufficient to cause their illnesses was not reliable.80  
Dr. Kilburn also testified that the Goebs’ symptoms were the 
result of exposure to Dursban. 81 In explaining his methodology, Dr. 
Kilburn stated that he first determined whether the Goebs were 
exposed to Dursban. He then reviewed relevant medical and scientific 
literature to determine the toxicity and adverse health effects of the 
agent. Finally, Dr. Kilburn considered the dose response relationship 
of the agent.82 Using this method, Dr. Kilburn concluded that the 
Goebs were clearly exposed to Dursban because the chemical was 
applied to the interior of their home. Further, the peer-reviewed 
literature regarding the adverse health effects of Dursban established 
that the Goebs’ symptoms were wholly consistent with exposure to 
the chemical.83  
Despite Dr. Kilburn’s clear explanation of his methodology, the 
court found his testimony unreliable because, like Dr. Sherman, he 
could not state the Goebs’ exact exposure dose.84 Thus, the court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Dow and Tharldson. 85 
 
 77. Id. at *5. The Dow publications described the condition as organophosphate 
poisoning. Id. 
 78. Id. at *4. 
 79. Id. at *5. 
 80. Id. But see Interview with Dr. Arthur Zahalsky, supra  note 71 (stating the overall level 
of exposure is not as important as the level of the toxin absorbed into the tissues and, 
ultimately, the DNA). 
 81. Goeb, 1999 WL 561956, at *5-6. 
 82. Id. at *5. 
 83. Id. at *5-6. 
 84. Id. at *6. 
 85. Id. at *2. Without Dr. Sherman or Dr. Kilburn, the Goebs could not show causation. 
Id. 
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2. Case II: Anderson v. Quality Stores, Inc.86  
Anderson, a sixty-seven-year-old retiree, used cans of spray paint 
to paint a number of window shutters.87 The following evening, he 
began to have significant difficulty breathing and over the next two 
days experienced generalized weakness in his arms and legs, chest 
congestion, and indigestion. 88 He was admitted to the hospital and 
diagnosed with Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome.89 Anderson’s 
condition continued to deteriorate and he died approximately three 
weeks later.90 
Anderson’s wife brought an action claiming that her husband’s 
death was the result of his inhaling toxic chemicals from the spray 
paint.91 Two experts testified that the inhalation of chemicals in the 
spray paint caused Anderson’s respiratory condition and subsequent 
death.92 The district court concluded that neither expert’s testimony 
was reliable because, like the experts in Goeb, they were unable to 
quantify Anderson’s exact exposure level.93  
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that hard evidence of the 
exposure dose was not necessary to support expert testimony on 
causation so long as the exposure is harmful and the claimant was 
exposed.94 The court further held that an expert’s opinion based upon 
a differential diagnosis and a strong temporal proximity between the 
exposure and the onset or worsening of symptoms satisfies the 
reliability prong of Rule 702. 95 
 
 86. No. 98-2240, 1999 WL 387827, at *1 (4th Cir. June 14, 1999). 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Anderson , 1999 WL 387827, at *1. Mrs. Anderson brought a diversity action alleging 
strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. The court stated that the record clearly reflected that Mr. Anderson painted twenty-
two shutters and that the relevant chemical and medical literature supported a conclusion that 
the presence of chemicals from the spray paint in the lungs could result in pulmonary problems. 
Id. The court found that because the experts based their opinions on a reliable differential 
diagnosis and a strong temporal relationship between exposure to the fumes and the onset of 
Mr. Anderson’s symptoms, the district court abused its discretion by excluding the opinions. Id. 
at *2-3. 
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3. Exact Should Not Equal Reliable  
When a district court engages in a microscopic analysis of every 
step of the expert’s process, it loses sight of the appropriate level of 
scrutiny and the proponent’s low burden of proof.96 The Goeb court 
required the experts to quantify the exact exposure dose before it 
would consider their testimony reliable.97 As a practical matter, this 
dooms most meritorious cases from the onset.98 Symptoms 
infrequently occur immediately after exposure and ascertaining the 
exact exposure dose would require tests and samples before they 
were aware of a problem.99 Such a requirement also ignores the fact 
that some individuals may suffer adverse reactions even at relatively 
low exposure levels. Further, an accurate analysis of exposure dose 
and the immediate administration of tests are unlikely to be achieved 
in a “real world” setting. 100 This exacting demand does not comport 
with either the “more likely than not” burden required to satisfy a 
preponderance of the evidence, or the “more liberalized approach” 
envisioned by the Supreme Court.101 By requiring an expert to 
identify the exact exposure dose, the Goeb court confused the 
“reliability” inquiry with a “correctness” or “accuracy” inquiry, thus 
effectively raising the standard of admissibility above the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.102  
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit took a more plaintiff-favorable 
 
 96. The proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of establishing that they met 
the pertinent admissibility requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. See Bourjaily v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987). 
 97. Goeb, 1999 WL 561956, at *5. 
 98. Interview with Dr. Arthur Zahalsky, supra note 71 (explaining that by the time 
symptoms arise, it is generally too late to pinpoint the exact exposure dose). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,  REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE  187 (1994)) 
(“[O]nly rarely are humans exposed to chemicals in a manner that permits a quantitative 
determination . . .. [H]uman exposure occurs most frequently in occupational settings where . . . 
it is usually difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the amount of exposure.”).  
 101. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-92. 
 102. See Lillis v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., No. CIV.97-3459, 1999 WL 718231, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1999). The Third Circuit recognizes that the standard of reliability is not a 
high one. The main goal is to exclude so-called ‘junk science’. See also Allison v. McGhan 
Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1321 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that courts find an abuse of 
discretion under Daubert when the admissibility bar is too high). 
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approach in Anderson. It adopted the position that a differential 
diagnosis and a strong temporal relationship will sufficiently satisfy 
the proponent’s burden under Rule 702. 103 This view is consistent 
with the preponderance of the evidence standard because it 
acknowledges opposing viewpoints, incorporates reality, and accepts 
that information need not be perfect to be reliable. 
The Fourth Circuit’s approach in Anderson comports with 
Daubert because it relies on the adversarial system to ultimately 
determine the accuracy of the testimony. 104 The Daubert Court 
expressly stated that the district judge’s gatekeeping function was not 
intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.105 
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 
careful instruction on the burden of proof remain the appropriate 
means of attacking shaky, but admissible, evidence.106 Daubert’s 
language crystalized the Court’s intention to allow the adversary 
system to flesh out the reliability of evidence that is not necessarily 
beyond reproach.107 This language also clearly indicates the Court’s 
intention to admit less than perfect testimony;108 an intent that the 
Goeb court clearly missed. As the Second Circuit stated in 
McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., trial judges acting as gatekeepers must 
not assume the role of St. Peter at the gates of heaven, usurping the 
role of the jury by “performing a searching inquiry into the depth of 
an expert witness’s soul,” thereby usurping the role of the jury. 109  
 
 103. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., 167 F.3d 146, 154-56 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that a medical 
expert may offer an opinion that the chemical caused the plaintiff’s illness absent hard evidence 
of the level of exposure to the chemical in question); Curtis v. M & S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 
661, 671 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the law does not require the plaintiff to show the precise 
level of the chemical to which he or she was exposed). 
 104. Daubert, 509 U.S.  at 588-89.  
 105. Id. at 589. 
 106. Id. at 588-90; see also Allison, 184 F.3d at 1311.  
 107. Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., No. 92 CIV.2900 (NRB), 1999 WL 461813, at *1, *2 
(S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1999) (citing Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995), as 
advocating “a bias in favor of admitting evidence short of that solidly and indisputably proven 
to be reliable.”).  
 108. Lappe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 857 F. Supp. 222, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding the 
fact that an expert may have neglected to perform some “essential” test goes to the weight of 
the testimony, not its admissibility).  
 109. 61 F.3d 1038, 1045 (2d Cir. 1995).  
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B. Ipse Dixit of the Court: When Testimony is Reliable Because the 
Court Says it Is 
At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which courts engage 
in little or no reliability inquiry. 110 The following examples illustrate 
how the nature of the case can dramatically affect the level of 
scrutiny employed by the court. As shown, courts often apply a lower 
bar of reliability in cases of murder111 or sexual assault.112  
1. Case I: United States v. Charley113  
Charley concerned the alleged sexual abuse of two young girls.114 
The government’s115 expert witness, Dr. Junkins, testified that the 
girls’ medical and psychological problems 116 could be attributed to 
the presence of an incredibly stressful situation, such as sexual 
abuse.117 Despite the fact that the examination and review of the 
medical records118 revealed no physical evidence of abuse,119 Dr. 
Junkins stood by his diagnosis. He stated that the records were not 
inconsistent with sexual abuse because, in general, children’s tissues 
heal quickly.120 The district court allowed the testimony. 121 On 
 
 110. See infra notes 110-28 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Urias v. Texas, No. 03-98-00673-CR, 1999 WL 546860, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 
July 29, 1999) (admitting police officer’s opinion that a stab wound was “life threatening” 
because the trial court “could properly have determined that he possessed special knowledge 
and that his testimony would assist the jury . . ..”). 
 112. See United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1999) (allowing F.B.I. agent’s 
testimony without a significant reliability inquiry because it was helpful to the jury in 
understanding how child molesters operate); In re Doe, 981 P.2d 723, 735 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1999) (admitting testimony of a social worker after cursory a review of her experience because 
there was a “reasonable basis to infer” that the opinion was “based upon an explicable and 
reliable system of analysis.”).  
 113. 189 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 114. Id. 
 115. The alleged incident constituted a federal case because it occurred on an Indian 
reservation.  
 116. Charley, 189 F.3d at 1263. Both girls were suffering from urinary tract infections, 
kidney infections, bed-wetting, abdominal pain, paralysis, and nausea. Id. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 1256. Dr. Junkins based his testimony on his interview of the girls, a physical 
examination, and a review of their medical and treatment history. Id. 
 119. Id. at  1263. No signs of scars or bruising appeared on the girls and both girls had 
intact hymens. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion because these types of general and conditional opinions 
were reliable.122 
Judge Holloway, in his part-concurring and part-dissenting 
opinion, noted that the majority had failed to show how the trial court 
determined that the admitted testimony was reliable.123 The expert 
witness neither described any method by which his opinion was 
reached, nor discussed the factors bearing on the reliability issue.124 
2. Case II: Deering v. Reich125  
Deputy Sheriff James Reich shot and killed Reinhold Deering 
during an attempt to serve an arrest warrant.126 Reich contended that 
his use of force was justified because Deering pointed a shotgun at 
him, and Reich claimed that he fired because he believed his life was 
in danger.127 Reich sought to bolster his claim with the testimony of a 
forensic pathologist, Dr. Greenbaum, who stated that Deering’s 
wound tracks were consistent with Deering aiming a shotgun at Reich 
at the time he was killed. 128  
The court admitted Dr. Greenbaum’s testimony without question, 
despite the fact that she did not perform the actual autopsy.129 The 
court based its reliability determination on Dr. Greenbaum’s 
involvement in at least seventy-five autopsies on bodies with bullet 
wounds.130  
 
 121. Id. at 1258. 
 122. Charley, 189 F.3d at 1264-65. The majority stated that cross-examination is the proper 
tool for clarifying ambiguities in testimony. Id. at 1269. 
 123. Id. at 1276-77 (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 124. Id. 
 125. 183 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 126. Id. at 648. The decedent’s estate brought an action against Reich alleging the use of 
unreasonable force and deprivation of constitutional rights.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 654. 
 129. Id. at 653. The court made no inquiry into the methodology employed and did not 
seek any explanation as to why Deering’s wounds indicated that he was aiming a gun at Reich 
at the time he was killed. Id. at 653-54. 
 130. Id. at 654. At best, Dr. Greenbaum’s previous experience adds credence to her 
testimony that Deering died as a result of gunshot wounds.  
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3. The Standard Should Not Change Based on the Type of Case 
The relaxed reliability inquiry and low level of scrutiny applied in 
both Charley and Deering are inconsistent with either Goeb or 
Anderson.131 While this approach may seem appropriate in cases of 
murder or sexual assault, it does little to bring consistency or 
predictability to the judicial process. Moreover, this “open door” 
approach is as incompatible with the principles espoused in Daubert 
and Kumho and the overly restrictive approach taken in Goeb. Justice 
Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Kumho, stated that the discretion 
granted to the district courts is neither “discretion to abandon the 
gatekeeping function . . . [nor] discretion to perform it 
inadequately.”132  
C. Material Flaws: Focusing on Issues Truly Germane to Reliability 
In practice, no methodology is flawless and no expert opinion is 
immune from well-reasoned attack. However, when flaws are so 
severe that they cut to the heart of the expert’s methodology, they 
render the testimony unreliable. Uncertainty exists when an expert’s 
methodology falls in the gray area between almost flawless and 
severely flawed. When does a flaw go to the weight or credibility of 
the expert? When does it render the methodology and the 
accompanying testimony unreliable? Is it sufficient if the expert 
demonstrates that the methodology employed is generally accepted in 
the field, or should the district court examine every step of the 
expert’s process, from data gathering to reasoning the conclusion, to 
uncover any possible inconsistency? The following cases highlight 
the disparity and confusion surrounding the question of when a flaw 
sufficiently renders an expert’s testimony unreliable. 
1. Case I: Kinser v. Gehl133 
On August 17, 1994, Tim Kinser, an alfalfa farmer, died when he 
 
 131. See supra notes 63-110 and accompanying text. 
 132. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 158-59 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 133. 184 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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became entangled in the compression rollers of an alfalfa baler after 
he slipped while working in his field. 134 The decedent’s wife filed a 
product liability action alleging that the Gehl baler was unreasonably 
dangerous and was negligently designed and manufactured.135 The 
plaintiff’s relied on the testimony of two expert witnesses—Dr. Jerry 
Purswell and Mr. William Kennedy—to make their case.  
Dr. Purswell was a mechanical engineer with a doctorate in 
industrial engineering. 136 He consulted with agricultural 
manufacturers in litigation concerning the adequacy of instructions, 
warnings, and guarding on certain farm equipment; he taught classes 
on “product design from an ergonomics standpoint;” and he 
published articles concerning the ability of product warnings to 
influence the way individuals operate products.137  
Mr. Kennedy had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering 
and operated his own consulting firm specializing in product and 
vehicle accident reconstruction.138 He reviewed the depositions of 
several farmers and traveled to the accident site to take measurements 
of the accident scene and watch Kinser’s baler in use. In addition, he 
examined industry standards publications and various baler 
manufacturers’ operator’s manuals.139 
Both experts concluded that the manufacturer feasibly could have 
fit the Gehl 1870 baler that Kinser was using with a guard similar to 
the one used on other balers in the field. 140 The experts also agreed 
that such a guard would have prevented or at least greatly reduced the 
severity of Kinser’s injuries.141 
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Dr. Purswell’s testimony did not 
satisfy Daubert because he had never published a paper on 
agricultural equipment or consulted on issues concerning this 
 
 134. Id. at 1264. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1271. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 1271-72. 
 139. Kinser, 184 F.3d at 1272. 
 140. Id. The two experts pointed to the John Deere SIO and the Vermeer 504-C closed-
throat balers that incorporated the suggested safety features years before the Gehl model was 
first marketed. 
 141. Id. 
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particular type of farm equipment.142 Mr. Kennedy’s testimony, on 
the other hand, failed to satisfy Daubert because he never had 
designed a piece of agricultural equipment or operated a hay baler.143  
2. Case II: Oglesby v. General Motors Corp.144  
James Oglesby suffered serious burns while working on his 
pickup truck when the radiator hose detached from the radiator.145 
Oglesby filed a product liability action against General Motors, the 
manufacturer of the truck, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, 
and strict liability. 146 Douglas Bradbury, a former professor of 
mechanical engineering at Clemson University, testified that 
Oglesby’s injuries resulted from a defective plastic hose connector 
between the radiator and the radiator hose.147 
Mr. Bradbury based his opinion on his visual inspection of the 
broken part, measurements of the part’s physical dimensions, and 
photographs.148 He concluded that the connector was “out-of-round” 
and that the condition must have been due to a defect because the 
plastic could not be remolded once it was set.149 However, Mr. 
Bradbury did not test the connector or analyze the material from 
which it was made.150 As a result, he failed to discover that the hose 
connector was not plastic but was actually a nylon composite.151 In 
addition, the physical properties of the composite were such that it 
was capable of being remolded or distorted under extreme heat and 
pressure.152  
The Fourth Circuit held that Mr. Bradbury’s testimony was not 
reliable because he neither knew the type of material from which the 
 
 142. Id. at 1271. 
 143. Id. at 1272 . 
 144. 190 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court rendered the Kuhmo decision in the 
period between the district court and the Fourth Circuit rulings. The circuit court deferred to the 
district court’s discretion in refusing to consider the expert witness’ testimony. Id. at 249. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 247. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Oglesby, 190 F.3d at 248. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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part was made nor had any knowledge of its properties. As such, Mr. 
Bradbury could not rule out the fact that the accident could just as 
likely have been caused by the pressure of Oglesby leaning on the 
radiator tube while the engine was overheated.153  
3. Flaws: When are They Material?  
While both Kinser and Oglesby focused on very narrow and 
specific flaws, the relevant inquiry focuses on whether those flaws 
were material in determining reliability: Did they truly render the 
methodology unreliable and prevent the expert from reaching a well-
reasoned and reliable conclusion? In Kinser, both Dr. Purswell and 
Mr. Kennedy had engineering backgrounds and extensive experience 
with agricultural machinery. 154 However, in order to render a reliable 
opinion on the feasibility of installing a safety guard that was 
commonplace in the industry, the court also found it necessary for 
these witnesses: (1) to have consulted previously on issues 
concerning that “particular type” of farm equipment;155 (2) to actually 
have “designed” a piece of agricultural equipment;156 or (3) to have 
personally “operated a hay baler.”157 Essentially, the flaws identified 
by the Kinser court were qualification issues.158  
The fact that the experts could have been “better” qualified should 
have gone to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. 159 As 
such, the flaws were not material to determining reliability because 
they neither undermined the information on which the methodology 
was based, nor the way in which the methodology was applied to or 
“fit” the facts.160 Preventing Dr. Purswell and Mr. Kennedy from 
 
 153. Id.  
 154. Kinser, 184 F.3d at 1271-72. 
 155. Id. at 1272. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1270, 1272. 
 158. See Heller v. Shaw, 167 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 1999) (warning courts not to mistake 
credibility questions for admissibility questions). 
 159. Lillis v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., No. CIV.97-3459 1999 WL 718231, *5 (E.D. Pa. 
1999) (citing Holbrok v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996), and ruling 
that it is an “abuse of discretion [for the district court] to exclude testimony simply because . . . 
the proposed expert [is not] the best qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the 
specialization that the court considers most appropriate.”). 
 160. See Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). “Fit” refers to the expert’s ability 
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testifying was analogous to preventing a clothing manufacturer from 
testifying about garment construction because he does not know how 
to sew or preventing an architect from testifying about the proper 
construction of a building because he has never hung a steel girder or 
poured a concrete footing. 
On the other hand, the flaw in Oglesby was much more material. 
Before his testimony would be admitted, the court required Mr. 
Bradbury: (1) to have identified the material used to manufacture the 
connector; (2) to know and understand the physical properties of that 
material; and (3) to investigate the stresses to which the connector 
was subjected. Unlike Kinser, the flaw identified by the Oglesby 
court was directly related to reliability. The fact that Mr. Bradbury 
neither knew the type of material from which the connector was 
made nor possessed any knowledge of the material’s properties 
directly undermined the information on which he based his 
methodology. 161 Thus, the flaw was materia l and the court rightly 
excluded his testimony.  
IV. CURRENT PROPOSALS  
As Part III clearly illustrates, the broad discretion granted to 
district court judges in Kumho resulted in trial courts arriving at 
disparate results in factually similar cases.162 This disparity increases 
uncertainty for litigants, undermines the public’s faith in the judicial 
system, and opens the door to selective forum shopping. 163 Most 
commentators agree that courts need greater uniformity in the level of 
scrutiny and burden of proof required to establish reliability. To that 
end, a number of solutions have been proposed. This section 
discusses the two most prominent proposals. 
 
to extrapolate a logical conclusion by applying the methodology to the facts of the case. The 
Court noted that exclusion is appropriate where “there is simply too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion proffered.” Id. See also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 
 161. Oglesby, 190 F.3d at 248. 
 162. Compare McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995), with Moore v. 
Ashland Chem., Inc ., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 163. James E. Starrs, There’s Something About Novel Scientific Evidence, 28 Sw. U. L. 
REV. 417, 437-38 (1999) (suggesting that forum shopping may be likely when federal 
prosecutors are involved in cases of interstate crimes touching more than one federal venue). 
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A. Court-Appointed Expert 
One proposal currently promoted is the appointment by the court 
of its own independent expert. Under this approach, a court appoints 
an expert either by inviting them as a formal witness under Rule 706 
or as an informal technical advisor.164 If the expert serves as a 
witness, the court must adhere to the requirements of Rule 706.165 
However, the court may elect to have the expert serve only as a 
technical advisor and private consultant to the judge. Proponents 
suggest that this approach will eliminate bias and diversity of 
opinion; yet, significant debate remains over whether hearing one 
side of the story increases reliability. 166 In addition, evidence 
indicates that court-appointed experts have a disproportionate impact 
on the outcome of litigation. 167 
Another concern regarding the use of court-appointed experts is 
that they are traditionally selected from professional organizations or 
societies.168 These societies and their members frequently are active 
in various business or political issues.169 Therefore, the court- 
appointed expert might not actually be the neutral referee presumed 
by the judge or jury because the expert is likely to have some 
sympathy or prejudice that conflicts with the position of one of the 
parties.  
 
 164. Jane Aiken & The Honorable Joel B. Rosen, Dealing with Daubert 12 (1998) 
(unpublished materials for the Federal Judicial Center Workshop for United States Magistrate 
Judges) (on file with author). 
 165. FED. R. EVID. 706. Rule 706 requires giving the expert notice of his duties, advising 
the parties of any of the expert’s findings, and permitting deposit ion and cross-examination by 
both parties.  
 166. Marilee M. Kapsa & Carl B. Meyer, Scientific Experts: Making Their Testimony More 
Reliable, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 313, 328 (1999). 
 167. Cwik, supra  note 7, at 66. In a study of fifty-eight cases with court appointed experts, 
only two resulted in decisions that were inconsistent with the position taken by the expert. Id. 
 168. Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 166, at 328-29. 
 169. Id. A court seeking an expert on chemical safety or toxicity may select a member of 
the American Chemical Society, the world’s largest professional society. However, the 
American Chemical Society is extremely active in defending, protecting, and promoting the 
chemical industry against public skepticism and litigation. Id. 
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B. Revision of Rule 702 
There have been a number of proposals to revise Rule 702 and 
codify Daubert and Kumho.170 The proposed amendment to Rule 702 
states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise-if 
 (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) 
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods  
reliably to the facts of the case.171  
Despite the significant debate spurred by this proposed revision, 
Congress may adopt it in the near future.172 Supporters believe the 
revision will strengthen judicial decision making because it will 
increase the reliability of expert testimony. 173 However, supporters 
fail to explain how the mere codification of existing principles will 
result in increased reliability. Critics, on the other hand, aptly point 
out that the revision does little to clarify the vague standards by 
which courts measure reliability. They also speculate that the revision 
may result in increased litigation costs due to more extensive fact and 
data gathering. Some see the language of subpart (1)—“based on 
reliable facts or data”—as an improper invasion into the province of
 
 170. Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/archive/1999/repevid.pdf (last visited May 11, 2001) (proposal of The 
Evidence Rules Committee, Rules App.B-53) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report].  
 171. FED. R. EVID. 702 (Proposed Draft 1999), available at http://www/law.umich.edu/ 
Thayer/ 699proamend.htm#702text (last visited May 11, 2001). 
 172. Advisory Committee Report, supra  note 170. 
 173. Id. Some of the largest supporters of the revision include: the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association; the Federation of Insurance and Corporate Defense Counsel; the International 
Association of Defense Counsel; the National Association of Manufacturers; the Product 
Liability Advisory Council; and Nissan of North America, Inc. Id. 
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the jury because the role of the trial judge is to examine the 
methodology and its application to the facts, not to examine the facts 
themselves.174 
V. MODEL APPROACH 
The following model provides district court judges with a 
practical guide to conducting a reliability inquiry into expert 
testimony. The model is clear, yet it encompasses sufficiently broad 
guidelines and familiar legal principles that balance the desire for 
greater uniformity and predictability with the need to maintain a 
flexible approach.175 
A. Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of Admissibility 
The process of admitting expert testimony should start with a 
Daubert inquiry and a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
admissibility. This position comports with the spirit of Daubert, 
which suggests that scientific evidence should be presumed 
admissible.176 Further, the favorable presumption promotes judicial 
economy because it eliminates needless reliability inquiries and 
minimizes litigation costs where applicable.  
B. Limit Experts to Their Specialized Fields 
The court should confine the expert’s testimony to the expert’s 
area of expertise.177 This prevents genuine specialists from offering 
 
 174. Id. at 5. 
 175. The Model Approach assumes that either the party seeking to exclude the evidence 
(majority approach) or the court, sua sponte, has already initiated a Daubert inquiry. 
 176. See Jarvis,  1999 WL 461813, at *2 (citing Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d 
Cir. 1996)). 
 177. Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736, 766-67 (N.D. Iowa 1999). An expert 
qualified in one area of expertise may be precluded from offering opinions beyond that area of 
expertise. For example, one who is qualified in general psychiatry may not be qualified to 
testify on the diagnosis and treatment of gender identity disorder. Id. See also United States v. 
Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1991) (“An expert’s opinion is helpful only to the extent 
that . . . [it] is an opinion informed by the witness’ expertise.”); Gray v. Briggs, 45 F. Supp. 2d 
316, 323-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (limiting a secur ities expert from testifying on specific provisions 
of ERISA). 
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unscientific speculations and eliminates the risk of exposing the jury 
to an opinion that the expert is not qualified to give. Moreover, 
limiting the scope of the expert’s testimony will make it easier for the 
court to distinguish reliability issues from issues that go to the weight 
of the evidence. 
C. A Court Should Only Exclude Expert Testimony When the 
Methodology Contains a Material Flaw 
A court should only exclude an expert’s testimony when it 
contains a material flaw in the methodology. From the cases 
discussed herein, one may extrapolate a definition of a “material 
flaw” as a flaw that significantly undermines the information on 
which the methodology is based, or that significantly undermines the 
way in which the methodology can be applied to the facts.178 A court 
may also exclude expert testimony if minor flaws are so numerous 
that, in the aggregate, they constitute a material flaw. It is improper, 
however, to exclude testimony solely because the methodology is 
susceptible to criticism. Furthermore, once the court qualifies the 
expert, issues relating to the witness’s qualifications go to the weight 
of the evidence, not to its admissibility.  
D. Strict Adherence to the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard 
A district court should conduct the reliability inquiry with an eye 
toward the proponent’s burden of proof. An expert’s testimony 
achieves reliability when it is “more likely than not” that there are 
sufficient grounds for the expert’s conclusion. 179 The court must 
remember that the preponderance of the evidence standard allows for 
significant doubt as well as contrary opinion. Therefore, it is 
improper for the judge to exclude testimony merely because he or she 
believes that better grounds exist for an alternative conclusion or the 
 
 178. See supra Part II.C. In Oglesby, the failure to determine the material composition of 
the item precluded the expert from testifying as to its physical properties. Oglesby, 190 F.3d at 
248. 
 179. It is proper to look at the conclusion because it is virtually impossible to determine 
“fit” without doing so. See Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).  
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discovery of some flaws in the methodology. 180 The overarching 
principle of the Daubert and Kumho inquiry is reliability. For a court 
to require more constitutes an abuse of discretion.  
E. When in Doubt, Admit Expert Testimony 
To give meaningful precedential value to Daubert and Kumho, 
district court interpretations must comport not only with the language 
of the opinions, but also with their spirit.  
1. Historical Analysis and Courts’ Language Supports 
Liberalized Admission 
An examination of the reliability inquiry’s evolution uncovers a 
trend that moves consistently toward a more liberalized approach. 
Under Frye, a judge had to “count the scientific votes” to determine 
the accepted theory in the field and compare it to the proffered 
testimony. 181 A judge deemed testimony inadmissible if the expert’s 
theory was not in accord with the rest of the relevant scientific 
community. This effectively excluded all novel or emerging sciences 
regardless of the principles involved.  
Daubert replaced Frye with Rule 702, a rule the Court described 
as having a “liberal thrust” in favor of letting the jury hear “all” the 
evidence.182 Daubert recognized that the universe of science 
constantly expands and that today’s novel science may become 
tomorrow’s generally accepted science.  
Kumho extended Daubert’s liberalized standard to all expert 
testimony. The Kumho Court went to great lengths to emphasize the 
flexibility of the reliability inquiry, an inquiry that courts fashion to 
fit the facts of the individual case. The Court expressly cautioned 
against the mandatory and mechanical application of the Daubert 
factors. Instead, the Daubert factors serve  as a starting point, to be 
applied whenever they can reasonably indicate reliability. Kumho 
emphasized that courts should admit expert testimony where it 
 
 180. Heller v. Shaw, 167 F.3d 146, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 181. Frye, 293 F. at 1013. 
 182. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. 
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“assists” the trier of fact. As such, Kumho clearly intended to open 
the door to the admission of theories that challenge existing 
orthodoxies.  
2. Gaining Admission is Only the First of Many Hurdles 
Opponents to liberal admission misplace concerns that liberalized 
admission will allow “junk scientists” to hijack the fact-finding 
process. Our legal system traditionally advocates the use of cross-
examination to uncover inaccuracies in lay witness testimony. No 
reason exists to believe that cross-examination suddenly becomes 
inadequate when applied to expert witnesses. No hard empirical 
evidence supports the argument that a lay juror is incapable of 
critically evaluating the reliability of expert testimony. 183 In fact, 
these claims prove as speculative and baseless as the “junk science” 
the opponents so desperately fear.184  
Notably, clearing the Daubert/Kumho hurdle and gaining the 
admission of expert testimony does not grant the proponent instant 
victory. It merely marks the first step down a long, pitfall-laden road. 
First, the proponent may find his case dismissed or his opponent 
granted summary judgment if the admitted evidence does not “fit” or 
is insufficient to show causation. 185 Second, the district court judge 
may so severely limit the testimony or direct the jury in such a 
manner as to render the testimony meaningless. Third, the judge may 
exclude the testimony under Rule 403.186 Fourth, vigorous cross-
examination will likely expose “junk science” or other questionable 
testimony. Finally, assuming the proponent overcomes all of these 
obstacles and the judge allows the expert testimony, the possibility of 
 
 183. Emanuel Imwinkelreid, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique 
from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 100 MIL. L. REV. 99, 114-16 (1983). 
 184. Claimant’s contentions cannot be supported by factual data and as such, would 
themselves be unreliable and inadmissible under a Daubert/Kumho inquiry. 
 185. E.g., Deiner v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting 
summary judgment because expert was sole proof of causation and opinion was not reliable); 
Pomella v. Regency Coach Lines, Ltd., 899 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (granting summary 
judgment because expert’s testimony did not “fit” facts of the case).  
 186. FED. R. EVID. 403. Judges may exclude evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury substantially outweighs the probative value of 
the evidence. 
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directed verdict and judgment not withstanding the verdict still may 
spell defeat.187 Thus, opponents misplace concerns that a liberalized 
policy of admission would impede the efficient administration of 
justice or that juries will blindly follow expert witnesses wherever 
they may lead. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the district court judge’s instincts urge him to seek 
certainty, science and experience provide only probability. 
Reliability, however, lies somewhere between certainty and 
probability. This tension, coupled with a lack of substantive direction 
from the Supreme Court, results in inconsistency and uncertainty for 
litigants. The clear and sufficiently broad guidelines and legal 
principles of the proposed model allow the district court judge to 
fulfill the gatekeeping function, while at the same time ensure the 
preservation of the role of the jury and the adversary system. In the 
end, any solution must be one that properly balances the desire for 
greater uniformity and predictability with the need to maintain a 
flexible approach.  
 
 187. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (stating expressly that these conventional devices, rather 
than wholesale exclusion, represent the appropriate safeguards).  
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